



MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK - DEFENCE & RESILIENCE

Wednesday 15 October 2025

18h00 Cocktail – 18h30 Roundtable – 19h30 Dinner & Debate
Members' Salon, European Parliament

Organised in partnership with The Consortium for Battery Innovation



INTRODUCTION – PARLIAMENTARY HOST



Rihards KOLS MEP, (ECR, Latvia) International Trade Committee and Rapporteur on Incentives for Defence-Industry Investment under “Re-Arm Europe”

I am pleased to be a co-host of this European Forum for Manufacturing. Special thanks to the Consortium for Battery Innovation for the partnership and to everyone who made the effort to be here tonight.

One of the reasons I am here to address you is that we are, I would say, on a brink, in a positive way, of a change of mindset in Europe when it comes to our defence capabilities and readiness. You have all heard the label Readiness 2030. I prefer “We Are Europe” – call it what you like — but the point is the same: Europe must be ready.

Tonight, we will have discussions and a Q&A. I already know – and welcome – that we will get very tough and very straightforward questions. We cannot spend forever in philosophy and strategic papers. Europe must deliver. Enough papers have been approved. Industry is waiting for hard currency to come in so factories can work, plants can be delivered, and Europe can actually be ready, as promised in Readiness 2030.

This evening is not only about defence industry initiatives. It is about Europe’s ability to act in a world marked by sharp policy rivalries and hardened geopolitics. We all recognise that we are facing an existential threat from the East – at least those of us closer to the East have certainly acknowledged that.

For industry representatives here tonight, we are exchanging views on what I believe is the most important political discussion in the coming weeks and months – and let us hope not years – the Multi-Annual Financial Framework [MFF]. The MFF is Europe’s biggest strategy: it encompasses the policies that will stand for the next seven years. I sincerely hope defence and resilience will be among the top priorities in the next MFF.

If we fail to embed defence and resilience into the next MFF with clear tools, flexible mechanisms and real ambition, we lose credibility – not only in the eyes of our citizens but globally. Otherwise people will say: “They just talk; little is delivered.” Credibility is at stake.

We often say Europe woke up after 24 February 2022. For some that awakening is still happening – and that is good. But the real question is: is political leadership truly waking up, or are we still sleepwalking, hoping the worst will pass and we can return to business as usual with our adversaries? We cannot afford that attitude.

European defence and industry must converge. So far that convergence has not been achieved. Past MFFs have focused on social and economic cohesion; military matters were almost a taboo across financial institutions and in some corridors of the Commission. But the ice is breaking, the sense of urgency is returning, and the old firewall between economic competitiveness and military dependence is not only outdated, it is dangerous. This is about defence readiness and the EU’s competitiveness; these items are deeply interlinked.

I have been given the honour to be Rapporteur on the Mini Omnibus for Defence, my first file as Rapporteur in the European Parliament. I will touch on that later, but briefly: the Mini Omnibus opens opportunities for Member States and industry to address increasing challenges: delivery;

capacity building; transparency, and competition. We must ensure it helps build capacity at scale and speed, with resilience.

What I urge you to focus on tonight is:

- What is blocking the scale-up of industry for defence and security?
- What's holding back coordination?
- Is procurement fragmentation the issue?
- There are good initiatives, but how will they work in practice?
- How can Member States cooperate
- How can industries cooperate so competition is healthy and actually benefits European citizens?
- Is there a blind spot in demand forecasting?
- Or is the problem simply that we lack the political courage to prioritise defence in the budget?

I encourage you to speak up and to be specific: if you criticise, propose solutions. I always welcome criticism, but I also ask for proposals – concrete ones – so we can discuss potential solutions together.

We must also examine the strategic role of your respective industries in any reshaped or newly established policies. What role will your industry play? We do not just need defence capabilities – we need them at scale, at speed, and with resilience. “Resilience” is a word often used lightly. How do we understand resilience? How do we measure it for industry, that it is durable and long term? That is an essential question.

We are also entering a sensitive area: the merging of civil and military sectors: dual use. Where do we draw the line between primarily military use and primarily civilian use? This matters for industries working on R&D and seeking Horizon funding.

There is reluctance in parts of the Parliament, and perhaps in some Member States, to accept dual-use approaches. I counter that with simple examples: take the chocolate bar – Snickers, Mars – originally developed for armies. Or radar, which was primarily a military tool but is now indispensable for civilian aviation. Military innovation can and has produced civilian benefits. That thinking should guide how we invest in dual-use R&D and infrastructure.

On infrastructure: roads, ports, rail, energy networks: these are not only about mobility and commerce but about military mobility and resilience. Historical disparities remain across Europe because of the Iron Curtain and different standards. If we want Central and Eastern Europe to reach Western infrastructure levels, IMF estimates suggest hundreds of billions in additional investment. I have heard a figure of some €600 billion for catching up. That is massive, but it is also an opportunity: investments in connectivity, resupply chains and mobility are investments in resilience.

We have NATO plans – 500,000 high-maintenance troops, 100,000 rapid response troops – but do we have the proper infrastructure? Do bridges hold the payload? Do rail links allow resupplies to reach the Baltics quickly? These are practical, urgent questions.

So tonight, I invite a frank, specific conversation. Ask the hard questions. Offer concrete solutions. Let us match the rhetoric with real, funded, actionable plans so that Europe can deliver readiness, defence, and resilience.

I look forward to the discussion.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION KEYNOTE SPEECH



Guillaume DE LA BROSSE, Head Defence Policy & Innovation, Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, European Commission

This our meeting comes at such an important moment: just before the Foreign Affairs and Defence Council with EU defence ministers this evening, and ahead of next week's European Council meeting of heads of state and government, where key decisions will be taken.

Setting the Scene

I will not go too deeply into geopolitics – you all know that context as well as I do. Instead, I want to focus on the European Commission's new plan, which aims to make European Defence Ready by 2030.

This plan is built around three main objectives:

- Stimulating and supporting defence investment by Member States
- Ensuring that Europe's defence industry is fit to meet this new demand
- Mobilising private capital alongside public funding to sustain the effort.
- Stimulating Defence Investment
Our first goal is to ensure that Member States have both the budget and the incentives to invest in defence rapidly and effectively.

To that end, we have put forward a financial framework of €150 billion in potential defence investments. What is remarkable is that, already after the first Call, Member States submitted projects worth nearly the entire amount – showing just how urgent and attractive this investment need has become.

This demonstrates not only the scale of demand, but also the willingness of Member States to act quickly.

In addition, we are enabling Member States to invest more nationally by giving those with sound fiscal positions greater flexibility – up to an additional 1.5% of GDP dedicated to defence spending. This could unlock as much as €650 billion in new investments over the next four years.

Crucially, these investments will be guided by clear, shared priorities – defined not by the Commission alone, but together with Member States, defence ministries, and heads of government. The idea is simple: to direct funds where they are most needed, filling capability gaps and ensuring strategic coherence.

- Ensuring an Industry Fit for Purpose
The second major objective is to make sure that Europe's defence industry is ready to absorb this surge in investment.

It is one thing to create demand – but we must also ensure that industry can respond. Contracts will need to be signed within the next two to three years if we want equipment delivered by 2030.

So we face a key question: Can our industry produce quickly enough?

If not, Member States may be tempted to spend their defence budgets outside Europe, which would undermine our collective effort. That is why we are taking steps to strengthen industrial capacity and simplify processes.

First, we have introduced a simplification agenda – cutting red tape and streamlining rules so that companies can manufacture more efficiently. This is not an easy discussion with the co-legislators, but it's essential.

Second, we are preparing new instruments to inject targeted funding where bottlenecks exist – whether in supply chains, production capacity, or scaling up key technologies.

In short, we are determined to make Europe's defence industrial base fit for purpose.

- **Mobilising Private Investment**

Public funding is vital, but it will not be enough on its own. That brings us to our third goal: mobilising private capital for defence.

We have already made important progress here. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has updated its lending policy, now allowing it to support more defence-related projects. This is a major shift.

Because the EIB is a standard-setter in the market, its policy change sends a strong signal – and commercial banks are following suit, becoming more willing to finance defence activities, including support for SMEs in the supply chain.

At the same time, we are building a pipeline of private investors, including venture capital and equity funds, interested in defence and dual-use technologies.

Through the European Investment Fund (EIF), we are creating mechanisms that allow private funds to invest in defence-related startups and scale-ups – helping to grow the next generation of innovators in the sector. This is essential, not only for funding manufacturing expansion (which often requires debt rather than equity), but also to support new entrants – the deep-tech companies that can revolutionize the way we do defence in Europe.

Moving from Planning to Delivery

We now have the strategy, the financial toolbox, and the policy framework in place. The next phase is delivery.

Tomorrow evening, we hope to finalise an agreement with the Parliament and the Council on the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) — a crucial step forward.

But as we move into implementation, two major challenges lie ahead:

Coordination – avoiding national silos and ensuring a truly pan-European approach.

- The Commission will propose a series of European flagship projects that bring together Member States across the EU-27, focusing on areas where collaboration is essential.
- Speed and Agility – ensuring that Europe can act with urgency.
- We must transition from a peacetime to a war-readiness mindset, both in our industries and in our administrations.
- That means faster manufacturing, faster development, and faster adoption of innovative technologies.

Only by doing this can we reach true Defence Readiness by 2030.

Conclusion

The lessons of Ukraine are clear: we must be prepared, coordinated, and agile. Europe has the industrial base, the financial capacity, and the technological talent to succeed – but only if we act together and with urgency.

That is the task before us: to build a strong, resilient, and sovereign European defence — ready for 2030 and beyond.

MEP VIEWS

Alexandra GEESE MEP (Greens /European Free Alliance, Germany),
Industry, Research and Energy Committee

I must begin by saying that I am not a defence expert, so I cannot deliver as precise and detailed notes as my EPP colleague before me. Instead, I would like to share a few broader reflections.

I grew up during the Cold War – tensions with Russia were familiar. But questioning our reliance on the United States? That is new, and deeply unsettling.

Former Chancellor Angela Merkel recognised this a few years ago, warning that Europe could not depend blindly on the United States. Yet, little was done until Russia's invasion of Ukraine forced us to act.

Let me illustrate this from my own policy area – digital policy. In September 2024, even before the election of the current US administration, J.D. Vance, now the US Vice President, said: "If you want to enforce the Digital Services Act, we might consider withdrawing our troops from NATO."

That was extraordinary. What is it about the Digital Services Act (DSA) that provoked such a statement? It is legislation that gives us transparency and insight into what happens on social networks. It is designed to help us counter a different kind of war – a hybrid war that includes cyberattacks, cyber-insecurity, and disinformation.

Anyone who has flown into Brussels lately might have noticed some of those cyber disruptions first hand. My own country has been particularly targeted by disinformation campaigns. These falsehoods spread faster and further than facts – and the DSA is one of the few tools we have to fight back.

So, when the US government attacks the DSA, it is not just about regulation — it's about Europe's capacity to defend itself in the information space. President von der Leyen captured this well in her State of the Union speech when she said: "We live in a world where dependencies are relentlessly weaponized. We must take back control over technologies to deter such threats."

This is why I began working on technological sovereignty – because Europe is far too dependent. Around 80% of our digital products and services come from the United States. In the cloud sector, this dependence is particularly alarming and cloud infrastructure is absolutely vital for the modern defence industry.



It is not just about physical equipment anymore – it is digital equipment, data, and software. Think of the F-35 fighter jet. What happens if the US government decides to stop its software updates? Or if access to data hosted on American clouds is restricted? These scenarios are no longer hypothetical – they are real vulnerabilities.

We must seize this moment – this crisis – as an opportunity to build technological sovereignty, both in defence and in digital sectors that underpin it.

A few weeks ago, I had the privilege of accompanying Commissioner Thierry Breton to ThyssenKrupp, where he presented the Commission's plans to support the steel industry, a sector now in serious crisis. He made a crucial point: the steel industry is not only an economic issue; it is a sovereignty issue. Steel is essential to our defence industry.

He also noted that even when buying basic electronic components, we face supply dependencies that can halt production entirely. This, too, is a dependency we must overcome.

So yes, this is a chance for Europe to achieve technological sovereignty. But we must use it wisely. We do not have unlimited public money, which means we must improve our capital markets, mobilise private equity, and channel investment into our digital and defence industries. Yet, there are areas where public investment is indispensable, and the Multiannual Financial Framework is our opportunity to ensure this happens.

This is not only about competitiveness. It is also about security, trust, and continuity.

At cloud industry events, I often hear a sobering phrase: “Your business continuity is now just one executive order away.” In other words, our economic stability can be disrupted by a single decision taken abroad.

This is about innovation, competence, and capacity – but also about people. We need to train and retain digital and technological talent here in Europe. Too often we educate brilliant young minds, only to see them move abroad – to the US, to other countries — where they develop world-changing technologies. We must create the environment for them to thrive here.

Public procurement has a key role in this. Remember – the great American tech companies started with DARPA contracts, part of the US defence sector. Those early public contracts built an entire industry.

So my message to you is clear: make sure European companies are part of this process. Make your voices heard. Engage actively in these discussions.

I had lunch today with the CEO of Schwarz Group, a German company known primarily for retail, but which in recent years has heavily invested in its own digital infrastructure. It is now a major cybersecurity and cloud services company in Germany. He explained how critical it has become to reduce technological dependency in these uncertain times.

Later, I joined a roundtable organized by the Munich Security Conference. Around the table were five or six US companies, a few lawmakers, and a German minister – but not a single European company. And every one of those US firms argued against European sovereignty, saying, “Just buy our services, do not build your own and certainly don't use public contracts.”

So, if there is one message I would like to leave you with tonight, it is this: speak up. Get involved. Use this crisis not only as a challenge but as an opportunity – to strengthen Europe, to empower your industries, and to build true technological sovereignty for the safety and future of us all.

PRIORITIES FOR EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING



Dr. Carl Telford, CONSORTIUM FOR BATTERY INNOVATION,
Research and Innovation Director

It is the first responsibility of any government in a democratic society to protect and safeguard the lives of its citizens. That is a task which I know this Parliament and the body politic that is the European Union takes extremely seriously.

In her recent State of the Union address, Ursula von der Leyen said “Europe must be ready to take responsibility for its own security.”

To that end every economic and industrial mechanism has a key role to play to ensure we have that resilience and that capability.

As we have been hearing the Commission has launched several initiatives designed to support industry and boost competitiveness. But there is still a way to go to ensure we are fully mobilised and capable of responding to any threat.

Industries, such as my own, continue to grapple with a plethora of complex regulatory challenges and administrative burdens. We make and recycle a wide range of advanced batteries used in essential applications across society, from automotive to defence and from telecoms to energy storage. What is more, we produce and recycle the raw materials needed to maintain the industry. We are strategically autonomous. All made in Europe and recycled in Europe.

As part of the defence readiness proposals 2030, we agree that the dual-use nature of key technologies and materials such as lead must be better reflected in the EU’s regulatory environment. Policy decisions taken on civilian applications can significantly impact the ability of EU supply chains to provide rapid response in a time of crisis or need, which in turn would impact defence capability and resilience.

And we strongly support the Commission’s proposal to broaden the conditions for use of the national defence exemption under chemicals legislation such as REACH. We also recommend mutual recognition of national exemptions of defence uses across the EU.

But there is no doubt that alongside increased competition from outside Europe, significant regulatory burdens remain within Europe remain. And while the rhetoric has shifted and there is a more pro-industry tone – there is plenty more to do to reduce the bureaucratic burden, the uncertainty, and ensure a level playing field, and a technology neutral approach, for the many companies I represent.

Let me give you a flavour of our contribution to the defence industry - batteries made in Europe are used:

- in military vehicles – from tanks to armoured personnel carriers.
 - as propulsion batteries for diesel-electric submarines
 - standby batteries for nuclear submarines
 - specialist batteries for over 80 different types of military aircraft
 - Military microgrids also use lead batteries for their inherent flexibility, safety and reliability.
- You get the picture. Together, these applications underscore the strategic importance of both the lead and lead battery sectors in Europe.

And it is just one example of a European industry and supply chain – one of many – all of which are needed to help support the industrial infrastructure necessary to build and sustain Europe’s defence capability now and in the long term.

That is why it is essential that the EU maintains the manufacturing, research and recycling capabilities of the lead and lead battery industries as part of its defence industrial base. Any regulatory activity should be viewed through this prism and be proportionate.

We are playing our part as the Consortium for Battery Innovation, continually developing the next generation of advanced batteries. From novel flexible microgrids to repurposing lead battery technology to make hydrogen fuel, our projects have myriad defence and security applications.

I would urge all the institutions represented here tonight to ensure that there is a concerted effort to boost and protect our industrial base and to work together to strengthen our collective security.



René Schroeder, ESIA – The European Semiconductor Industry Association, Director General

Semiconductors (or ‘chips’) are everywhere – they are key components of everyday electronic devices that make life easier, safer, more secure, and greener. From a policy perspective, semiconductors are a common denominator for achieving European ambitions across the board, from the green to digital transitions. Security is another important aspect. Semiconductors are a key enabler of downstream sectors, the “industry of industries” essential for Europe’s competitiveness and resilience.

Europe is home to leading semiconductor manufacturers, like integrated device manufacturers and foundries, equipment manufacturers, and material providers as well as research and technology organisations.

The European semiconductor market is forecasted to grow to \$53 billion in 2025, or a 3.4% increase from 2024. Sustained growth in the European market is expected to continue in following three years, with an average yearly growth of 5.4% and sales reaching \$56, 59 and 62 billion respectively in 2026, 2027 and 2028.

Europe is strong in key industry verticals - automotive, industrial, Internet of Things, power, smart home, and medical applications. In this sense, the semiconductor ecosystem in Europe has given rise to leadership in microcontrollers, power semiconductors and sensors for industrial and automotive end markets - and manufacturing equipment. Additionally, our industry stands out for their high level of innovation output.

The next Multiannual Financial Framework is essential to deliver long-term impact. The Competitiveness Fund needs to become a tool fit for purpose to invest in key industrial priorities, in which Europe has or can develop a competitive edge. It should reflect the priorities of Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem to strengthen its globally leading position.

In the case of the semiconductor industry, the Multiannual Financial Framework proposal cannot be seen in isolation only, but must also be regarded in the context of the wider policy developments. The work on the Multiannual Financial Framework runs in parallel to the discussions on an EU Chips Act 2.0.

The goal of the Chips Act 1.0 has been to strengthen Europe's position in the global semiconductor market by investing in production, research, design, and testing. The goal was for Europe to

increase its market share in the semiconductor space to 20% by 2030 from the current 8%. Yet, semiconductors are subject to global competition with all major regions developing ambitious industrial policy plans. Hence, more work is needed.

Against the background of global competition, the EU Chips Act 2.0 is necessary to further improve the legal framework and strengthen the semiconductor industry in Europe. Beyond manufacturing capacity, the Chips Act 2.0 should focus on aligning with industry, end-market realities, and strengthening Europe's position in the global value chain.

The revision should focus on conditions to innovate across all segments of the supply and value chains and strengthen the industrial innovation infrastructure. It will be of utmost importance to set a clear focus on industrial deployment when revising the research dimension of the EU Chips Act. Today's research should be aimed at winning tomorrow's markets.

Cooperation with industry verticals should be strengthened and significantly expanded. It will be key to address areas of artificial intelligence when mastering future breakthrough innovations. This will lead to a world-leading position of the semiconductor industry in Europe. A two-pronged approach targeting foundational chips for AI and European leading-edge chips for AI should be developed.

Additionally, the existing funding toolbox for supporting semiconductor projects demands improvement. A semiconductor budget for highly strategic projects should be established, underpinned with fast decision-making processes, flexible eligibility, ambitious budgets, and funding rates similar to many examples in other regions of the world.

Furthermore, an institutionalised high-level dialogue between policymakers and the semiconductor industry in Europe must be set up to address Europe's competitiveness gap, focus on areas of European strength, and identify areas of critical and strategic technologies where Europe has the capacity to lead.

Lastly, simplified administrative and regulatory rules should be implemented to empower companies to innovate and seize market opportunities and create a positive business environment. This would ensure fair competition among the different regions in the world.

Looking forward to further shaping the next MFF framework with policymakers and stakeholders.

Chris Haenen, GE AEROSPACE, Vice President Government Relations, EU & NATO

GE Aerospace is a leading company in aerospace and the market leader in aircraft propulsion, both in the civil as well as the military domain. We have approximately 55,000 employees, of which 13,000 are based in Europe.

GE Aerospace plays a crucial role in supporting European armed forces, acting as a key supplier to the majority of EU Member States' military forces and contributing to developing Europe's future capabilities. Take Avio Aero, our main subsidiary, a European military propulsion powerhouse with over 115 years of expertise and a true crown jewel of the Italian defence industry. Avio has played a crucial role in the Tornado and Eurofighter programmes and serves as a key maintenance provider for the Italian Air Force and Navy. Recently, Avio joined the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), a 6th



generation fighter jet, and the Eurodrone as an industrial partner. Finally, GE Aerospace is also the partner for the Swedish Saab Gripen jetfighter, providing the engine for all its versions, an example of a strong transatlantic partnership.

Time For Realism

An increasingly complex and unstable geopolitical environment poses significant threats to Europe's prosperity and security. Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its alliance with a more assertive China and other coercive economies, show the need for more geopolitical realism. This requires bolstering the European defence industry, improving strategic planning and resilience against external shocks. In this context, strengthening cooperation with strategic partners, particularly within the NATO Alliance, has never been more critical.

A MFF Fit-For-Purpose

The next MFF must be the backbone of that effort – resourcing the industrial base, enabling joint procurement, strengthening interoperability, and accelerating innovation. Without adequate, predictable, and flexible funding, strategy will remain plans on paper.

The reasons that funding matters are straightforward:

- First, we must replenish and modernise stocks quickly. Industry requires firm, multi-year demand signals to invest in capacity, workforce, and tooling.
- Second, we must ensure interoperability across allied forces. Europe's deterrence depends on systems that plug and fight together. Funding should prioritize joint procurement and open architectures.
- Finally, we need to scale the European defence industrial base while remaining open to trusted partners that bring technology, capacity, and speed. Strategic autonomy is about the ability to act; it is not autarky. It succeeds when Europe can choose among multiple secure sources—including those embedded within Europe's economies.

European Preference: The Wrong Medicine For The Problem

This brings me to a pivotal point – US-headquartered companies should not be excluded from EU funding simply because of their parent location. The reality is clear – these firms are part of Europe's industrial fabric. They manufacture in EU Member States, employ tens of thousands of European workers, invest in local R&D centers, and operate supply chains in the EU including many SMEs.

Categorical exclusion would be counterproductive to Europe's security and resilience for three reasons: speed, interoperability and competitiveness. Open, contestable procurement that includes EU-based subsidiaries of global firms fosters lower costs, better performance, and faster innovation. It strengthens European SMEs through supply-chain participation and technology transfer, rather than narrowing the field and risking capacity shortfalls.

Inclusion does not mean laxity. The EU has rightly implemented robust safeguards: FDI screening, export controls, cybersecurity requirements, these instruments ensure that participation is secure, compliant, and aligned with Europe's strategic interests. They enable the EU to be open and selective at the same time.

So, what should the next MFF deliver to make defence policy real?

- First, a dedicated, sufficiently funded envelope for defence industrial capacity, joint procurement, and rapid innovation.
- Second, multi-year, flexible instruments that allow expedited contracting, framework agreements, and advance purchase commitments to unlock factory expansions and workforce growth.

- Third, clear eligibility criteria that prioritise EU security outcomes: EU value creation; EU-based manufacturing and jobs; compliance with EU standards, and contribution to interoperability – rather than exclusion based on headquarter’s location.
- Fourth, investment in training, testing, and certification ecosystems to speed qualification of new systems and upgrades across Member States.

Focus On Outcomes, Not Ideology

This approach aligns with “open strategic autonomy.” It keeps Europe in command of its choices, strengthens the EU’s ability to act, and leverages the full breadth of trusted capacity already operating inside the Union. By focusing on outcomes, we advance European security without erecting barriers that slow us down.

In closing, the stakes are too high for narrow definitions. Let us fund with purpose, implement with discipline, and partner with all who are committed to Europe’s security and who build in Europe. That is how we will deliver the capabilities Europe needs, when it needs them, at the standards our citizens expect.



Alexander Majer, DOW, Government Affairs Director, Chemical Management

I am very happy to share Dow’s perspective today on the critical themes of resilience, defence, and funding –issues that are not only timely but fundamental to Europe’s strategic autonomy and industrial future.

Let me begin by introducing Dow. We are a global chemicals and materials science company, headquartered in Michigan, in the US, but heavily invested in Europe, where we are proud to operate 26 production sites across 9 European countries.

Our materials are deeply embedded in the EU’s industrial fabric, supplying sectors driving the green and digital transitions—automotive, construction, energy, packaging, and more.

Coming to the topic of today’s event, resilience in defence requires materials that perform under extreme conditions. And let me give you an example that we know well at Dow, which is silicone chemistry.

Silicones, a hybrid chemistry which is the product of silicon metal, are used across the defence and aerospace industry, in sensors, avionic display units, engine components, rocket nozzles, and thermal protection systems, to name a few. These materials are deployed in planes, ships, drones, satellites, and launch systems—making them indispensable to Europe’s defence and aerospace capabilities.

In the EU, Dow manufactures silicones in Seneffe, Belgium and Wiesbaden, Germany, contributing directly to Europe’s strategic supply of advanced materials. These sites exemplify how chemical production supports not only industrial innovation but also national and collective security.

However, the European chemicals industry is facing significant headwinds:

- Energy costs in Europe are two to three times higher than in competing regions
- Overcapacity is leading to plant closures—11 million tons of capacity have already been shut down in the past two years
- And regulatory complexity makes it more difficult to make investments.

Dow, like many others, has had to make difficult decisions in recent months. These are not isolated cases, they reflect a broader competitiveness crisis in the sector.

To restore competitiveness, we need bold and coordinated policy action. Everything needs to be on the table for discussion and there can be no holy cows.

The Chemicals Industry Action Plan provides a good framework – addressing energy, trade, regulation, and innovation. Key measures include:

- ETS indirect cost compensation,
- regulatory simplification to reduce burdens and support competitiveness
- and robust trade defence tools.

But it needs to lead to tangible policies.

For example, the Critical Chemicals Alliance could be an important initiative, if it helps to recognize the complex value chain interdependencies typical of the European industrial fabric, rather than falling into the trap of honing in on some specific sub-sectors and forgetting about others.

That was arguably the mistake made with Net Zero Industry Act, which was too focused on clean tech and forgot about the industrial interconnections that make operations in the EU viable — and which is only now being corrected with the Industry Accelerator Act to offer a pathway to streamline permitting and accelerate clean technology deployment for energy-intensive sectors.

In short, over 90% of all manufactured goods rely on chemicals. Defence is no exception. These are not just inputs, they are enablers of resilience, drivers of innovation, and pillars of strategic autonomy.

Europe must cherish and grow its chemical industry. Without it, our ambitions for defence, decarbonisation, and digital leadership will falter.

And let us be clear – a future without significant parts of the chemical industry is today more likely than it has ever been, unless the policy framework changes.

Let us work together to restore competitiveness, secure supply chains, and unlock sustainable growth.

Bernhard Müller-Härlin, ZVEI – German Electro and Digital Industry Association, Manager Foreign Trade

ZVEI, the Electro and Digital Industry Association in Germany comprises more than 1,100 member companies and 170 employees.

At the end of 2024, the electrical and digital industry employed 900,000 people in Germany. This makes it the second largest industrial sector in our country. The sector's 2024 turnover amounted to €220 billion. The industry is one of the most innovative economic sectors in Germany.

In a technology-driven world, the defence industry is inconceivable without the electronics and digital industry. Modern defence systems rely on electronic components, software, and digital infrastructure – from cabling and semiconductors to sensors and artificial intelligence.



Tonight, we are all united in our goal of ensuring that Europe can assert itself amid major geopolitical changes. This also means that European member states should build a strong European defence. In this context, ZVEI views the increase in defence funding under the MFF framework as very welcome. It simply has become a necessity.

Let me get to the Commission's proposal for the MFF. As we know the creation of the European Competitiveness Fund [ECF] would terminate a dozen individual programmes and absorb their objectives into its wider net. This can be more effective than many separate programmes, but it must be strategically and intelligently managed. It also means that Member States must participate and grant the Commission a genuine coordinating role, under democratic oversight by the European Parliament.

With regard to defence these programmes include:

- The European Defence Fund (EDF)
- The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP)
- The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)
- The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)

The media outlet Contexte reported on 18 July 2025 that the Commission was placing a new budgetary priority on the ECF: Buy European. ECF Article 10 promoted the idea of an "EU preference" as a means to relocate the manufacturing of key goods to EU territory and to "protect strategic and economic security interests." Access to funds would be conditional on meeting certain EU preference criteria.

According to Contexte, however, the ambition has been scaled back. The draft now merely states that fund allocation "may" be subject to the criteria.

This brings me to ZVEI's view on EU preference and local content.

In a globally connected economy, open markets, stable supply chains, and international cooperation are crucial for success. Therefore, maintaining free, global trade is essential for the German electronics and digital industries. Blanket local-content requirements run counter to this.

However, we believe targeted local-content requirements in narrowly defined areas, based on a binding trusted-supplier approach, can make sense. This applies, for example, to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, or defence. Our companies have the know-how and the ability to develop and expand the necessary technologies.

In this context, "local" should not be defined too narrowly. Targeted control and traceability of supply relationships are essential to avoid critical dependencies and to ward off espionage and sabotage.

Affected components should therefore be sourced exclusively from reliable and trustworthy sources – locally established or legally controllable through democratically legitimate partner states. What is needed is a well thought-out trusted-supplier approach that establishes clear criteria and standards for procuring trustworthy electronic components.

I do not want to deny the fact that this decision raises questions: relying on more trustworthy electronics will also make products more expensive. Sovereignty costs money, and we must consider very carefully how to regulate this with regard to the European Competitiveness Fund. But there is no way around it if we want to finally step-up Europe's resilience.

Olivier Janin, ORGALIM – Europe's Technology Industries, Deputy Director General

Europe's security and defence readiness rests on a simple truth: there is no credible defence without a strong industrial and technological base. And that base is Europe's technology industries – the companies represented by Orgalim – whose innovations power both our everyday economy and our collective security.

Orgalim members develop the dual-use technologies that underpin European defence capabilities: advanced manufacturing systems, industrial automation and robotics, electronics, semiconductors, sensors, cyber-secure networks, etc. These dual-use technologies are the bridge that connects civil excellence with defence readiness.



Competitiveness and resilience are two sides of the same coin. When Europe's technology industries are competitive, defence becomes more resilient. A competitive environment means we can prototype faster, industrialise quicker, and scale up production if necessary. It means we keep critical skills, IP, and value chains in Europe. So, the core question is how we ensure industry can fully play that supporting role while strengthening Europe's competitiveness.

Here are the priorities we see:

- Make the EU's new instruments work for dual-use innovation and scale.
The next Multiannual Financial Framework introduces a European Competitiveness Fund with a dedicated defence and space pillar. That is the right signal. Now we must translate it into impact: predictable calls, streamlined access for SMEs, and clear pathways from research to deployment and manufacturing. On top of that, the Commission's proposed Defence Readiness Omnibus – with fast-track permitting, simpler rules, and better access to finance – can have a sizeable impact.
- Put SMEs at the centre of defence readiness.
Europe's technology base is built on small and mid-sized companies. They are often the source of the most disruptive ideas – but they face the heaviest administrative load. SMEs must be able to seize the opportunities that come with increased defence investment:
 - Simplified access to funding and to consortia for defence projects
 - Proportionate compliance, particularly on supply-chain due diligence, security of supply, and cyber requirements
 - Fair IP and data arrangements so innovators can scale without losing the value they create.

If a dramatic change in the geopolitical situation demanded it, SMEs would need to scale up production rapidly. That requires flexible manufacturing capacity, guaranteed access to finance and working capital, accelerated certifications, and fast-tracked hiring and upskilling.

Europe should pre-agree the 'surge mechanics' –financial backstops, priority access to critical inputs, and one-stop administrative support—so we are ready before a crisis strikes.

- Treat supply-chain security as a strategic capability.
We cannot be resilient if we are dependent. Electronics, advanced materials, rare earths, and semiconductors are critical to both civil and defence technologies—and they are precisely where Europe's vulnerabilities are greatest. We support EU efforts to diversify sources, expand European refining and processing, develop circular recovery and recycling for critical materials, and de-risk chokepoints in the electronics and semiconductor value chains. Every risk removed from a supply chain is readiness added to Europe's defence.

- Foster a full and competitive steel value chain in Europe.
Our industries are major downstream users of steel, which they use to manufacture the technologies underpinning European defence. In recent years, the EU has put in place measures to support the steel sector, which is facing challenges related to decarbonisation and overcapacity. Recent examples are CBAM and the new trade measure to address global steel overcapacity.

These measures will certainly help steel producers, but they will also dramatically increase manufacturing costs for our industries, which are left with no solution whatsoever for the resulting loss in competitiveness. We urgently need a fundamental rethink of this approach, with measures that can work for the full steel value chain. Steel is of no use if you cannot build with it the technologies Europe needs.

- Invest in skills, standards, and interoperability.
Defence readiness depends on people. Europe should double down on engineering and technician skills, dual-use doctoral pathways, and rapid recognition of security clearances across borders for key industrial roles.

On the technical side, common standards and certification for dual-use components—especially in electronics, cybersecurity, and manufacturing—will shorten lead times, enable cross-border teaming, and reduce the cost of scaling.

Our message to policymakers is constructive and concrete:

- Keep dual-use at the heart of the EU defence agenda – because that is where Europe’s industrial strengths lie.
- Deliver the promised simplification – from permitting to procurement to EDF rules – so companies, especially SMEs, can contribute at speed.
- De-risk critical supply chains end-to-end, from raw materials to advanced components to system integration.
- Rethink approach towards steel to make it work for the entire value chain.
- Support skills and standards that make interoperability a reality and scale-up feasible.

If we do these things, Europe’s technology industries will do what they do best: innovate, industrialise, and deliver – for our customers, for our economy, and for our security. Dual-use technologies will remain the bridge between civil excellence and defence capability. And Europe will move from defence ambition to defence readiness, anchored in a competitive, resilient industrial base.



Filip Geerts, CECIMO – European Association of Manufacturing Technologies, Director General

When we speak about defence and resilience, we must begin with a simple truth: neither can exist without a strong industrial base. And that industrial base is built on advanced manufacturing technologies – machine tools, additive manufacturing, robotics, and digital production systems.

These are not simply tools; they are strategic enablers. They are what allow Europe to design, produce and innovate and, therefore, to remain sovereign and competitive.

If Europe is serious about building a credible defence and resilience agenda, we must be strategic about how we use and develop our manufacturing capabilities.

Advanced manufacturing is not only about efficiency, it is about strategic and technical autonomy. It ensures that Europe retains the capacity to produce high-precision components and systems within its borders and avoiding dependency from third countries.

The United States and the United Kingdom have already recognised this link.

They have adopted dedicated advanced manufacturing strategies for defence, focusing on distributed manufacturing networks, secure digital supply chains, and certification of 3D-printed parts.

Europe cannot afford to be left behind. We must identify where we excel – but also where we need to improve – if we are to match that level of strategic integration.

Let me give two concrete examples that are already providing the defence sector with great solutions:

- Additive manufacturing, or 3D printing, is already transforming defence logistics.

It allows on-demand production of spare parts in the field, reducing the need for long and vulnerable supply chains. Military forces can now carry digital design files instead of tonnes of physical components – producing what they need, when and where they need it. In France and Spain, for example, we already see Defence Ministries investing in deployable additive manufacturing centres – reducing lead times, costs, and dependence. But more European coordinated actions need to be taken if we want to fully exploit the potential of these technologies for the defence sector.

- The second example is the Mobile Smart Factory — a deployable, self-contained production unit equipped with machine tools, additive systems, and digital process control.

It can produce spare parts for military vehicles and equipment directly in or near the field. This transforms maintenance from a logistical burden into a technological capability. It enhances readiness, autonomy, and resilience. And its applications go beyond defence – these mobile factories can support disaster response, infrastructure repair, and energy resilience.

To make this vision a reality, Europe's Multiannual Financial Framework must recognise Advanced Manufacturing as a critical pillar and directly include this sector in the segment dedicated to defence and resilience.

It should be explicitly integrated across Horizon Europe, the Competitiveness Fund, and the Defence Industrial Strategy – not as a secondary theme, but as a core enabler of all strategic industrial objectives.

If we want a resilient and secure Europe, we must invest in the technologies that make production possible: the machine tools; the robotics; and the digital platforms that underpin our industrial and defence sovereignty.

Defence and resilience start on the factory floor.

Let us ensure Europe's factories have the recognition, the resources, and the strategic vision they deserve.

Maria Rosendahl, TEKNIKFÖRETAGEN – Technology Industries of Sweden, Head of Industrial Policy

First, I would like to stress that businesses have several capabilities that are crucial for a stronger and more resilient EU: innovation capacity, production capacity and a strong ability to manage crises, and not only that – they are fast. Without a strong industrial ecosystem in Europe – we cannot defend our continent.

EU must strive for initiatives that strengthen companies, and especially industry, competitiveness, innovation and resilience. I am talking about everything from better regulation and risk sharing models to make it attractive to scale new technological solutions in Europe, but also an attractive research and innovation system, where industry, academia and other actors can collaborate to solve urgent issues, at the European level.



Innovation is one important key to succeed. Global technological progress in strategically vital areas – important for our transformation, resilience, and competitiveness – is advancing rapidly. These technologies often vary in maturity (i.e. how long time left to reach the market), which makes timing, precision and flexibility in policy responses critical.

Here, we see the new, three major proposals presented by the European Commission in July as crucial. The MFF, the new Competitiveness Fund and the next Framework for Research and Innovation – Horizon Europe – are critical to make sure that the civil technology and manufacturing industry will have the right prerequisites to deliver the knowledge, collaboration and innovation, as well as having access to the right tools to commercialise/industrialise the research, in Europe. This is important from a defence perspective, as it forms the basis for dual use. We are pleased to see that the proposed policy window for defence and resilience in the research program and the fund is the largest part of the budget.

But to succeed, a core question that follows is how to involve industry in a more strategic and transparent dialogue within the EU research, innovation, and industrial policy. The Competitiveness Fund and Horizon Europe must be designed in such a way that industry must be empowered to articulate its needs across the entire value chain: from basic and collaborative research to innovation and access to cutting-edge technology infrastructure as well as industrial risk sharing tools and venture capital that enables companies to scale.

We want industry to choose to locate research investments, production and scale-up of strategically important technologies within the EU. In order to make that happen - the right conditions must be created. Asia moves quickly and adapts rapidly to new challenges with advanced technical solutions. Industry knows what we must do in the EU to make it happen.

To conclude – and this cannot be stressed enough – companies hold several vital capabilities that are fundamental to building a stronger and more resilient European Union. Their innovation power, production strength, and proven crisis management skills make them indispensable partners in shaping the EU's future. The EU can point out the overall direction – but to attract more private capital, make strategic and wise allocation of resources to solutions with clear market potential, and close the innovation gap - it is crucial that businesses are actively included in strategic discussions going forward



Rihards KOLS MEP (ECR, Latvia) International Trade Committee, Rapporteur, Incentives for Defence-Industry Investment under “Re-Arm Europe”

Thank you for all the interventions. I think there has been a lot of realism from the industry side – and clear messages for policymakers in particular.

I did have my prepared statement, but rather than repeat what has already been said, I would like to focus directly on what we have almost concluded – the first major impact on the defence industry from the work of the European Parliament, the Commission, and the Council: the so-called Mini Defence Omnibus – or as I sometimes call it, the “small animal” that will soon grow into something much larger.

But before diving into that, I want to pause for a moment. There is something that has been on my mind – this habit we have in politics of constantly trying to invent new slogans for every policy. Even the term strategic autonomy sounds great. Everyone likes the idea: that Europe should be independent, not dependent on others.

But let us be honest – if we truly wanted full strategic autonomy, we would have to get rid of globalisation altogether. And that is impossible. The world is interdependent, whether we like it or not. It has been built that way over decades. Strategic autonomy, in the absolute sense, is wishful thinking.

Of course, we can and should aim to strengthen our own capabilities, our own production, our own deliveries. But even the number one economy in the world – the United States – depends on others. Around 70% of rare earth minerals they use come from China. Is that strategic autonomy? Clearly not. Yet the U.S. still dominates in the defence sector. So the point is: we can manage interdependence, but we cannot eliminate it.

This is important, because too often in politics we get caught up in who can come up with the fancier title or the more impressive slogan. Just look at the recent debates around the so-called Strategic Compass. Personally, I think what we really need these days is a Moral Compass – something that shows us the right direction, especially when it is broken.

Anyway, coming back to our current work here in the European Parliament. We have now concluded the Committee phase and are entering the final stage – the Trilogues between the Commission, Parliament, and Council – to agree on the final text of the Regulation.

The goal of this Mini Omnibus is clear: to ease the burden on both Member States and industry and to deliver tangible results quickly.

Why do we call it the “Mini Omnibus”? Because, as you know, we already have the European Defence Industry Programme, which will be voted on tomorrow and is linked to the next Multiannual Financial Framework.

But we still have the current MFF running until 2027 – and there are still two years left, with funds still available. Recognizing this, the European Commission, based on the Readiness 2030 Framework, has proposed opening up five existing programmes for defence and security-related projects.

These are:

- Horizon Europe
- Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform [STEP]
- European Defence Fund [EDF]
- Digital Europe Programme
- Connecting Europe Facility [CEF].

This is the first time there is real consensus that these Programmes can be open to defence-related and dual-use projects. Each has its own focus, of course:

- Horizon Europe, for example, will have a dedicated channel for defence and dual-use innovation. It is managed by the European Innovation Council Accelerator, an independent body – meaning no member state can influence which projects are selected.

One key issue identified here is the so-called non-bankable problem, especially for SMEs. Many have high-readiness prototypes or advanced technologies, but cannot get financing from banks. Under this new channel, if a company can show it was denied funding by a financial institution in its member state, it can be fast-tracked for EU support. This is a big step forward – especially for small and medium-sized innovators.

- For Strategic Technologies for Europe, we currently have three priority areas: digital, biotech, and clean and resource-efficient technologies. We are now adding a fourth priority: defence and security. The funding is not massive, but it is significant for innovation in these fields.
- Digital Europe – everything related to digitalisation, modernisation, optimisation — this is relevant to all manufacturers and defence suppliers right now.
- And then the European Defence Fund, which remains the cornerstone for defence-related R&D and industrial collaboration.

Now, what is truly innovative in this exercise is that Member States will be given flexibility to use their existing structural and investment funds – such as cohesion funds – to support these defence and dual-use programmes.

We are not creating new money here. We are unlocking what is already there. And in many cases, those envelopes are still quite thick. Across the EU, Member States on average have used only about 50% of their cohesion funds.

For example, in my own country, Latvia, the data from the Commission shows that by 2026, we will still have €650 million in cohesion funds unallocated; by 2027, another €640 million – together, about €1.3 billion.

With this Mini Omnibus, governments will have a limited window of time to reallocate such unused funds into the defence and dual-use programs that best fit their national priorities – for example, in Latvia's case, probably the Connecting Europe Facility.

If we approve the Mini Omnibus by the end of this year, Member States can start reallocating funds in 2026. Projects would be submitted and financed through 2027 – and since the MFF funding flows until 2029, there's room for continuity and stability.

This is, in my view, a smart and pragmatic approach.

And yes, while some may say, "Well, the Recitals do not matter, only the Articles do," I would disagree. The Recitals give important political guidance for what comes next – for how the Commission should prepare the next MFF and the next generation of instruments.

So right now, what matters most is time. We cannot afford endless debates over definitions and details. We need to deliver. This Regulation gives flexibility– it is not mandatory. Member States decide whether to use this opportunity or not. But for industry – especially SMEs – it is a signal that additional EU funding channels are opening for innovation, scale-up, and partnerships.

That is the essence of the Mini Defence Omnibus: a short-term, targeted initiative that can unlock up to several billion euros across Europe – and as I often hear, when it comes to innovation, you do not always need billions. Sometimes even half a million injected into the right SME can make all the difference.

And let us remember – it is time to move past the fancy slogans and start delivering real, tangible results.



Kamila GASIUK-PIHOWICZ MEP - Vice Chair of the Internal Market Committee, Rapporteur Opinion on the European Defence Industry Programme and Framework of Measures to Ensure Timely Availability and Supply of Defence Products

Europe is facing an unprecedented security crisis. The level of Russian provocations is higher than during the Cold War. Russia is actively testing our capacity to respond to future aggression. The case of the drones shot down in Poland is a clear example. These provocations are no longer limited to the Eastern Flank. It was only a few days ago that the head of the German foreign intelligence service warned us that Russia would be able to launch an attack against NATO members before 2029. It is a race against the clock.

Nobody in Europe can withstand Russian aggression alone. United, if all European nations spent 5% of their GDP on defence, our combined defence budget would be ten times higher than that of the Russian Federation. Back in 2023 the combined budget of European NATO members was more than double compared to that of Russia in 2025. We have twice as many fighter jets, more weapons, more people and above all, we invest in quality over quantity. This is our combined force.

We also have shortcomings. We delivered no fewer than 18 different types of 155mm howitzers to Ukraine. The problem was they not always fit in all the artillery systems also donated by Europe. Our internal market was made for civilian goods and services. It is time for an update. If we want to ensure the timely availability of defence products it's time to create a true single market for them. We need to focus on standardisation, interoperability and coordination.

We are already working towards that goal. I am the EPP IMCO Shadow Rapporteur for the part of the Defence Readiness Omnibus Directive aiming to simplify the Defence Procurement Directive and the Directive concerning intra-EU transfers of defence products. We hope to finalise the Parliament position by the end of this year.

This Directive will tackle concretely one of the most important barriers for cross-border cooperation between defence companies - transfer licences. General transfer licences will simplify these processes, reducing the number of documents and procedures needed for transfers within the Union. My aim is to have a comprehensive list of the situations in which they can be used, so that we capture as many as possible.

Second, we need to simplify defence procurement procedures and to make common procurement more attractive for Member States. This will aggregate demand and give business more predictability, while also tackling fragmentation. The aim is to encourage Member State to use these procedures. The current Commission proposal introduces some limitations, especially with regards to the eligibility criteria. I think this provision should be more in line with the provisions already adopted in the SAFE Regulation. We need to keep things practical, otherwise Member States will just continue with the same logic.

Another point I want to touch upon is innovation. The experience from the Ukrainian front shows that things change incredibly fast. Technologies considered state of the art are now almost obsolete. Both sides make breakthroughs and we need to make sure we invest in the technologies that will keep us prepared for the future. The innovation partnerships introduced in the defence procurement directive are a key step in this approach. They will allow us to engage with innovative companies and support them during the most vital stages of development, giving a clear perspective for firm orders in the future. As Shadow Rapporteur, investing in research and development and mitigating the risk in those early phases is a key priority for me.

We need to cooperate more within Europe, but we also need to stay open for business with our closest allies and partners. We need more security and defence partnerships, like the ones we have with Canada and the UK. We need to allow our companies to benefit from the transfer of technologies and know-how. In the IMCO opinion concerning EDIP, this was one of my main priorities. It did not get reflected in the final ITRE-SEDE text, but the idea is reflected in Articles 16 and 17 of the SAFE Regulation. I believe this should be the basis of future conversations, such as the one on the Competitiveness Fund in the next MFF. We create a European preference but we stay away from protectionism.

We can only ensure the timely availability of defence products if we use all our resources. Production under licence should not be completely excluded, especially when it concerns items in critical demand. Nevertheless, we must ensure that the long-term objective is to obtain the possibility to remove any restrictions related to these licences. This is a challenge we now face in EDIP and I hope tomorrow's results from the Trilogue will bring us closer to a more balanced approach, just as I advocated for as IMCO Opinion Rapporteur.

Europe has been built in times of crisis. Today we are facing the biggest one so far. United Europe is strong. To overcome this crisis we need to build a close partnership with you, the businesses that make up our defence industry. The EPP Group has always been and will continue to be a trusting partner to European business, always open to listening to your concerns. Our long-term objective is to move towards strategic autonomy, but in a realistic, gradual manner, which ensures nobody is left behind and making use of all resources available.

CLOSING REMARKS

Antony Fell, EUROPEAN FORUM FOR MANUFACTURING, Secretary General

My closing remarks are going to focus on the thanks to the wide range of speakers who have contributed to this evening's excellent debate on the Multi-Annual Financial Framework with a focus on Defence & Resilience.

First, I would like to thank our three MEPs: Richard Kols MEP the Rapporteur on Incentives for Defence Industry Investment under "Re-arm Europe"; Kamila Gasiuk-Pihowicz MEP Opinion Rapporteur on the European Defence Industry Programme and a Framework of Measures to



ensure the Timely Availability and Supply of Defence Products; and Alexandra Geese MEP a member of the Industry, Research & Energy Committee

I also wish to express our appreciation to Guillaume de la Brosse, Head of Defence Policy & Innovation in DG Defence Industry & Space in the European Commission. We were very pleased to hear a wide range of views from as Manufacturers from across Europe, who highlighted their priorities, providing the practical examples and proposing concrete solutions.

Finally, I would like to thank the Consortium for Battery Innovation, and in particular Hywel Jarman, Senior Director Communications and Dr Karl Telford, Research & Innovation Director. Their excellent team worked closely with the European Forum for Manufacturing in developing the programme for this evening's debate.

I now formally close this European Forum for Manufacturing dinner debate.

